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Abstract 
 
This essay explores how Samuel Beckett’s four postwar novellas 
express in narratological terms what the Austrian positivist Fritz 
Mauthner’s Critique of Language (published at the turn of the 
twentieth century) expresses in philosophical terms: a profound 
skepticism as regards the ability of language to convey concepts, 
emotions or information. We analyse three points of coincidence 
between the thought of the philosopher and the writer’s. 
 
 
1. Beckett’s Mauthner notes 
 
Despite Beckett’s well-documented attempts to put scholars 
off the track as to the role Fritz Mauthner might have played in his 
aesthetics (Ben-Zvi, 1983: 66; Garforth, 2004: 54), the quantity and 
quality of the notes that he took from his Beiträge zu einer Kritik der 
Sprache (1901-1903)  —eleven long entries in the Whoroscope Notebook, 
kept at Reading University (RUL MS 3000), and four typed folios 
housed in Trinity College Dublin (MS 10971/5)— testify that he read 
the Critique with interest, if only that. The fact that Beckett kept a copy 
of Mauthner’s work in his personal library in his later years shows that 
this was a lifelong interest. 
The dating of Beckett’s Mauthner notes has been the subject of 
much controversy, but the recent publication of Matthew Feldman’s 
Beckett’s Books seems to have settled the issue: Beckett first read 
Mauthner in 1938, between the writing of Murphy and Watt (Feldman, 
2006: 131). This must have proved disappointing for those eager to see 
the Austrian’s influence in Beckett’s “German Letter of 1937”, where 
he gave expression to his growing dissatisfaction with his own language 
in terms that Mauthner himself would have employed (Beckett, 1983: 
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51-54, 170-173). As it seems, Mauthner’s Critique would simply have 
reinforced a view that was already developing in Beckett: that the task 
of the artist was —to paraphrase his words in the German Letter— to 
tear apart the veil of language in order to get at the (No)thing(ness) 
behind it; in order, that is, to reach the silence that underlies All (ibid.). 
 
 
2. Mauthner’s Critique of Language 
 
This necessary destruction of language by means of language 
itself, in order to reach silence, is finally what Mauthner’s theory of 
language is about. There is no easy way to translate the complexities of 
Mauthner’s thought in a few lines, as we must do here, but Beckett’s 
own choice of quotations as transcribed and translated by Julian 
Garforth (2004: 57-62) can be our guide through the maze. Mauthner’s 
Critique holds that both external reality and inner life cannot be known 
through language because there is no one-to-one relationship between 
words and things. For him, words are only metaphors based on the 
memory of past sensory experiences; since everybody has different 
memories, the unsuitability of words for communication ensues. 
Thoughts and words are synonymous, but there can be no thinking 
without words; since words lack substance, our thoughts are equally 
inane and empty. The highest degree of critical attitude, Mauthner 
concludes, is silence. Aware of the absurdity of using words to explore 
the silence, he admits to being caught in their net, and compares the 
ascent in the critique of language with the climbing of a ladder whose 
rungs he must destroy by stepping upon it. It takes him almost two 
thousand pages (full of words) to reach this conclusion. 
In a letter of 1979, Beckett sums up his initial response to all 
this with his characteristic minimalist style: 
 
For me it all came down to:  
       Thought words 
       Words inane 
       Thought inane 
Such was my levity. (Ben-Zvi, 1983: 66) 
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3. Beckett’s critique of language in the Novellas 
 
The inevitable failure of trying to know truth through language 
is clearly what Beckett’s 1945 novel Watt is about. But the definite 
‘assault against words’ that he sees as a prerequisite to express that 
failure, will have to wait until the aftermath of the World War, when 
Beckett abandons his native language as an expressive medium and 
produces his first creative texts in French. The real breakthrough takes 
place when he writes a horizontal line across the notebook page in 
which he was writing a short story in English, only to continue it in 
French. Eventually published as La Fin, this story signals —together 
with three others that he writes in 1946— a distinctively new way of 
writing on Beckett’s part. It is from their English translations that we 
will be quoting here (The End, The Expelled, First Love and The Calmative) 
—for translated they were by the author once he had found a way of 
‘tearing apart the veil’ of his own language.  
Space restrictions have forced us to focus on just three points 
of coincidence between Mauthner’s thought and the predicament of 
Beckett’s nameless protagonists. These four, when expelled from their 
usual abode, begin a quest for an alternative refuge. While unrelentingly 
recollecting past events and commenting on their own narration, they 
embody Mauthner’s ideas that there is no thinking outside speaking, 
that the ego does not exist outside language, and that communication 
between men is impossible. 
 
3.1. There is no thinking outside speaking 
 
“We can only think what language permits us, what language 
and its individual usage allow us to think. […] I have said what language 
allowed me to say” (Garforth, 2004: 60). Beckett’s characters’ 
predicament makes good this equation between words and thought and 
the confusion that ensues, an equation that lies at the heart of 
Mauthner’s Critique. Witness the words of the first-person narrator of 
First Love at the outset of his story: “I associate, rightly or wrongly, my 
marriage with the death of my father, in time. That other links exist, on 
other levels, between these two affairs, is not impossible. I have enough 
trouble as it is in trying to say what I think I know” (Beckett, 1995: 25; my 
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italics). Trouble which, by the way, does not prevent him from going 
on and on in what ends up being the longest of the four stories; a chain 
of words which often he himself does not understand. He can be either 
excited, as when he finds the perfect shelter and exclaims: “Try and put 
me out now”, only to add “I seemed not to grasp the meaning of these 
words […] till some seconds after having uttered them” (41); or 
reflective, as when he muses “I wonder what that means” (35), that 
being the words he has just emitted. Words do not bring Beckett’s 
characters any closer to knowledge.  
This is Beckett’s new postwar aesthetics, where words become 
signs not of knowledge but of the failure of knowledge. “I have always 
spoken […] of things that never existed, or that existed if you insist […] 
but not with the existence I ascribe to them” (ibid.) —words by the First 
Love narrator that will still resonate when Beckett comes to write The 
Unnamable. 
“All thought takes place in the words of language and thought 
only resolves itself when the nebulous nature of words has become 
clear to us” (Garforth, 2004: 57) —thus reads one of Beckett’s 
manuscript notes from Mauthner. This ‘nebulous nature of words’ is all 
too present in the doubt-filled lives of these four protagonists, and will 
always be, if we trust the narrator of The Expelled who has spent a good 
long page and a half explaining the motives for his bizarre gait, only to 
reflect on his own justifications as follows: “[W]e may reason on to our 
heart’s content, the fog won’t lift” (Beckett, 1995: 51). This cryptic 
aphorism of sorts could well have its origin in the above-mentioned 
Mauthner quote —Beckett permitting. 
 
3.2. The ego does not exist outside language 
 
In these short texts, the I enters Beckett’s fiction never quite to 
leave it. One of the signature stylistic innovations of Beckett’s postwar 
prose, these novellas’ peculiar first-person narrative voice provides us 
with one of the clearest instances of convergence between the thought 
of the Austrian philosopher and the practice of the Irish writer.  
The I, for Mauthner, is contingent, a myth that does not exist 
outside language. An empirist, Mauthner states that we are aware of our 
ego because we feel ourselves at the centre of vision and hearing 
perceptions that clamour for our attention; but these are only 
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impressions that need memory to confirm that they also happened in 
the past and which are converted by the mind into words. As one of 
Beckett’s Mauthner notes reads, “Both experience and thought are only 
memory or language, the one viewed from the front, the other from the 
back” (Garforth, 2004: 61).  
Beckett’s protagonists struggle to reconstruct elusive past 
events, most of which end up being as elusive as the idea of I. The 
ego’s lack of consistency —its being formed by a series of individual 
memories without a link of continuity between them— is manifest in 
the anxious words of the narrator of The Calmative: “But it’s to me this 
evening something has to happen, to my body as in myth and 
metamorphosis, this old body to which nothing ever happened, or so 
little” (Beckett, 1995: 63). What he does next is recollect a recurrent 
past scene, clearly aimed at strengthening the sense of I that eludes him.  
In these words from The End, “the next thing I was having 
visions, I who never did, except sometimes in my sleep, who never had, 
real visions, I’d remember, except perhaps as a child, my myth will have 
it so” (98), the I that has visions now does not agree with the I who 
only had them as a child —according to the only myth of the 
character’s I that the narrator is aware of. Confusing, for us readers as 
much as for them speakers. 
 Snatches of childhood memories are, then, invoked to try to 
rebuild the I, but the participation of external witnesses that confirm 
these protagonists’ existence is also valued, and momentarily solves 
their inability to recall past moments. Hence the anxiety of these 
characters to contact others, which is particularly true of the anguished 
narrator of The Calmative. He sits alone in a quiet harbour and waits for 
something to happen, while he envisions a very different scene full of 
hustle and bustle where the dreamed-of contact could be reached: “it 
would be a sad state of affairs if in that unscandalizable throng I 
couldn’t achieve a little encounter that would calm me a little, or 
exchange a few words with a navigator for example, words to carry 
away with me to my refuge, to add to my collection” (65). May this 
serve as an illustration of the many other attempts on the part of the 
protagonist of this story to substantiate that there is an I that others can 
confirm. 
The narrator of The End, for his part, is about to give up; no 
one comes any more to take care of his needs, which means that no 
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one comes any more to confirm the external I to the internal I on 
which he concentrates: 
 
That no one came any more, that no one could come 
any more to ask me if I was all right and needed 
nothing, distressed me then but little. […] To know I 
had a being, however faint and false, outside of me, 
had once had the power to stir my heart. You 
become unsociable, it’s inevitable. […] Even the 
words desert you, it’s as bad as that. (97)  
  
“A being, however faint and false, outside of me” that could 
confirm that the I that I talk about is the same I that I feel —the 
narrator-protagonist no longer yearns for that, and is about to become 
speechless; and without speech there is no I, as we well know from 
Mauthner. 
 
3.3. Communication between men is impossible 
 
What happens when contact with others is made? Given 
Mauthner’s premise that language results from individual experience, 
from individual memories of past experiences, is it possible for two 
people to understand words in the same way? The Austrian’s answer is 
‘certainly not’: even if men think that they are communicating, they are 
simply taking part in a convention, unaware of the limitations of the 
instrument they use. But only the fools who understand and want to be 
understood suffer on account of those limitations, says the philosopher. 
In Beckett’s postwar novellas we find fools like those. If they 
talk incessantly about the most trivial things —a bench, a heap of dung, 
a hat, a coat, a plant, the weather— this is so as not to fall into the 
silence that results from the impossibility of knowing. “To think that in 
a moment all will be said” (75), says the frightened narrator of The 
Calmative when he senses that he cannot go on with his story. In an 
attempt to keep going, he reviews the encounters he has achieved in his 
wanderings through the city; “my spoils”, he calls them (ibid.), a booty 
made up of those whose mere presence or conversation momentarily 
confirm his existence. The common denominator of the scenes that 
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narrate those encounters is one of complete lack of communication, 
which is expressed in at least three different ways: 
1. In the form of dialogues in which the narrator-protagonist 
seems the only interlocutor. The speaking I of First Love, for instance, 
finds it irritating to talk to the prostitute who is his one ‘encounter’, 
because she repeats his very words and takes over some of his favourite 
expressions: “And the way she kept on saying I don’t know, I can’t. I 
alone did not know and could not.” (36). But this is before the woman 
reveals that she has a room for him, at which stage he exclaims, “At last 
conversation worthy of the name” (39). The human language is valid 
for practical purposes only, says Mauthner, and indeed at this point the 
asylum-seeking narrator understands the girl pretty well. 
2. In the form of verbal exchanges in which the narrator does 
not understand, or is not understood by, his interlocutor. The narrator 
of The Calmative is perplexed at one of his encounter’s using the same 
expression in two contexts that even he knows are very different: “there 
you have it all” (73), exclaims the man he’s met, after explaning the 
mechanisms of sexuality to him, and once again after showing him one 
of the little bottles he carries in his bag. “It can’t have been the same all 
as before” (74), exclaims a perplexed narrator on hearing the phrase for 
a second time.  
 In The End we have a clear illustration of Mauthner’s idea that 
the origin of words lies in personal experiences which cannot be shared 
with other people. When the angry narrator shouts “Exelmans!”, his 
interlocutor answers: “Come come, […] and anyway no one 
understands a tenth of what you say” (80). No wonder: Exelmans is the 
name of a French marshal that the average manager of a charitable 
institution —the man to whom the exclamation is addressed— is not 
expected to be familiar with; unless, of course, he has read Beckett’s 
novel Watt, written a year earlier, where the name of the military comes 
up in a list of dactyls that the character Mr Knott likes to enumerate: 
“Exelmans! Cavendish! Habbakuk! Ecchymose!” (Beckett, 1981: 209). 
As meaningless in the novel as in the novella. 
3. Lack of communication often takes the form of complete 
speechlessnes. An example will suffice: “I resolved to speak to him. So 
I marshalled the words and opened my mouth, thinking I would hear 
them. But all I heard was a kind of rattle, unintelligible even to me who 
knew what was intended. But it was nothing, mere speechlessness due 
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to long silence” (Beckett, 1995: 66). The tragedy of incommunication 
that these characters suffer is manifest in this passage from The 
Calmative. Perplexed when they cannot articulate a single word, they 
envisage the danger of falling into silence, certainly the most extreme 
expression of the inadequacy of language. Remember the almost done 
for narrator of The End: “Even the words desert you, it’s as bad as that” 
(97). If words disappear, so does the I. 
 
 
4. Epilogue: The voice of silence 
 
The man who pledged in 1937 to make an ‘assault against 
words’ and write the ‘literature of the unword’ has to make do with 
words. Like Mauthner, who needs three thick volumes to conclude that 
only with silence he could have brought his enterprise to a satisfactory 
end, Beckett undertakes his task well aware of his being condemned to 
fail. “All that the Beckettian author can conclude is that the I is not-I, 
that the coveted original one is no-one; that there is no-thing to be said 
and no-where to be journeyed to”, says Richard Kearney (1987: 360), 
and we would add, that there are sounds that emerge softly from the 
silence and so resemble it (cf. Beckett, 1995: 37), but are not. 
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